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This paper adopts a “piece-meal” approach to empirically identify, on a 
sample of Italian households, a collective model where both non-
participation and non-convex budget sets are allowed for. Two tax reforms, 
i.e. the 2002 tax changes recently introduced in Italy and a revenue neutral 
linear income tax are evaluated by the collective framework derived. The 
predictions obtained for individual labour supplies, income and welfare 
distribution are then compared with those of a traditional unitary model. 
The exercise provide an assessment of the distortion introduced in positive 
and normative analyses when individuals are assumed to behave as if in a 
unitary, rather than in a collective world. The results suggest that further 
efforts should be devoted to the analysis of intra-household decision 
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1. Introduction  
 
An economic evaluation of a tax and benefit reform should include measuring its impact 
on individual behaviour and welfare. Until recently, “unitary” models were providing the 
theoretical justification to consider households, rather than individuals, as the basic unit of 
decision, assuming either directly a household utility function or a representative agent 
preference structure. The drawback of such models is that they can provide no explanation of 
why households might present different consumption patterns depending on who receives child 
benefits or on other aspects of the tax-benefit system.  
A more appealing framework to deal with these issues is provided by the collective 
approach, which considers Pareto efficient decisions within a household, but imposes no 
restriction on the point of the Pareto frontier that is reached. The starting papers Chiappori 
(1988, 1992) and since then a good number of results have been added. One of the most relevant 
contributions of the literature at hand is to prove that the question of intra-household 
redistribution of resources can be crucial in determining the household decision process. 
Moreover, several parametric tests have been proposed to verify whether the traditional unitary 
model or more refined versions of the initial Chiappori’s model better describe the household 
behaviour. They are all (except for Vermeulen, 2001) consistent in rejecting the assumption of a 
unique household utility function being maximised.
1 
However, a lot of questions within the collective field remain yet unanswered. As far as 
the labour supply is concerned, it is only recently that issues such as (non) participation to the 
labour market and income taxation have received attention (see Blundell at al., 2001, Donni, 
2002 and Donni and Moreau, 2002).   
Nevertheless for policy purposes, it is time to explore the potential of the collective 
approach, since the use of a unitary approach has two main disadvantages. First, it can produce 
misleading predictions on individual behaviour, as shown on synthetic data in Beninger and 
Laisney (2001). Secondly, it takes for granted that a socially optimal redistribution of resources 
within the household will always follow any economic policy reform.   
This paper contains results of a research jointly developed by seven research units based 
in various European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) 
and it provides empirical evidence based on a sample of Italian households.  
The aim of the research is twofold. First it proposes an alternative approach to model 
household labour supply in a collective framework when taxation may produce non convex 
budget sets. Rather than empirically estimating a structural model of household labour supply, it 
focuses on modelling, with a “piece-meal” method the within household allocation along the 
Pareto frontier for any given tax and benefit system. Specifically, it calibrates a collective data 
set so that it closely reproduces the choice over disposable income and labour supply of a 
sample of Italian couples selected from the 1998 Bank of Italy survey, SHIW. The strategy 
followed is based on the identifying assumption that some aspects of individual preferences 
over consumption and leisure are unchanged after marriage. This  hypothesis allows us to 
estimate preferences of singles and to use them to simulate the within couple allocation of time 
and consumption. But single preferences are also complemented with a leisure interaction term 
allowing for substitution or complementarity in non working time when individuals in couples 
are examined. Both the leisure interaction term and a bargaining index describing the position 
reached by each household along the Pareto frontier are then calibrated on the Italian sample of 
couples.  
Secondly, the paper provides a measure of the distortion produced in the evaluation of the 
economic effects of a tax reform based on more traditional household models. Starting from the 
                                                 
1 A survey of these themes is contained in Chiuri (2000) and Vermulen (2000).  3 
1998 Italian income tax system, two tax reforms are taken into account: the recent 2002 income 
tax corrections and a revenue neutral linear income tax. The analysis is preceded by the 
estimation of the calibrated bargaining power index on a set of demographic and economic 
variables, including the way income taxes affect individual contributions to net household 
earnings. Such econometric analysis will provide the predicted values of the within household 
bargaining power in any given tax reform. Afterwards, predictions on labour supply, on income 
redistribution and on welfare changes derived by the calibrated collective model are compared 
with those by a unitary model.  
In the unitary model here estimated we assume a functional form that mimics a linear 
combination of the individual preferences chosen in the collective framework and explicitly 
estimate unobserved heterogeneity. In so doing, any divergence in predictions between the two 
approaches has to be attributed to model specifications. The larger is the distortion, the stronger 
is the need to switch to more appropriate household economic models. 
The paper is organised in eight sections. Section 2 describes in brief the 1998 Italian tax-
benefit system and the two reforms under consideration. In Section 3 the collective model and 
the “piece-meal” approach used are discussed. The data set and the main sample characteristics 
are contained in Section 4. Section 5 reports the empirical specification adopted and the relative 
results obtained. Section 6 concerns the calibration of the sharing rule and simulation of 
couple’s behaviour. The unitary model estimates are reported in Section 7. Finally, the 
discussion of intra-household effects of tax reforms and the divergence in predictions between 
the collective and the traditional household model are left to Section 8, followed by the 
conclusions.  
 
2. Italian tax- benefit system, the 2002 financial law and a linear tax reform 
 
2.1 The 1998 Italian tax-benefit system  
 
The progressive income tax (IRPEF - Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche) represents 
the main source of revenue in the Italian tax system. The tax unit is the individual, while the 
household composition affects the tax liability through a system of tax credits for dependant 
spouse and children. The tax base is mainly given by the sum of earnings (from labour, self-
employment and unincorporated firms) and income from real estate; income from financial 
assets is generally taxed separately with a proportional withholding tax.  
A more detailed description of the tax structure is provided in Tables 1 and 1.a with 
reference to the 1998 tax year. The tax schedule is piece-wise linear with five brackets, with 
rates going from a minimum of 19% to a maximum of 46% (over € 69,722). Figure 1 depicts 
typical profiles of marginal and average tax rates, computed on the basis of liabilities before tax 
credits.  
The final tax liability depends on a quite cumbersome system of tax credits, generally 
decreasing with income. The main credits are allowed for earned incomes and for dependent 
relatives. The former decreases with liable income, with different schedules according to the 
type of income, (depending on whether the tax payer is an employee, self-employed or 
entrepreneur): in particular, the credit allowed to income from employment varies from a 
maximum of € 868 to a minimum of 52 (for income over € 51,646). The amount of tax relief for 
dependant spouse is decreasing with income from € 546 till a minimum of 422. In 1998 the 
presence of dependent children entitled to a fixed tax credit of € 173 per child, the amount being 
shared by parents when they both have taxable income.  
As far as labour income is concerned, the picture must be completed by considering social 
security contribution and a family benefit in cash. The rates of social security contribution are  4 
quite high: for a blue collar of the industrial sector the overall rate is about 44%. But the tax 
burden is shared by employers and employees. As it is difficult to measure the economic 
incidence of social security contribution on employees/employers, we exclude them from the 
current research.  
On the benefits side, employees at low and middle wage levels are eligible to receive 
child benefits, whose amount decreases both with the number of children and with the level of 
household income (see Table 1.a) .  
The joint effects of employees’ income taxation, tax credits and child benefits are 
depicted in Figure 2 in terms of weekly hours of work. The reference case is a single person 
household with a dependent child and gross hourly wage of 10.24 Euro (observed average value 
in the 1998 sample of single women).  
 
2.2 The income tax reform in project and the 2002 financial law 
 
The Italian Government has announced a huge reform of the income tax structure that will 
be implemented in different stages starting in 2003 up to 2006. The plan is based on a 
considerable flattening of the tax function, that eventually will be based on just two rates (23% 
up to € 100,000; 33% over). The system of tax credits will be replaced by a simplified structure 
of allowances vanishing with income: their precise schedule has not yet been announced. The 
bill attributing the Government the power to implement gradually the reform is now under the 
scrutiny of Parliament.  
In the meantime, with the Financial Law for 2002, the Government has introduced a 
substantial increase in the tax credit for children at low and middle income levels. The 2002 
income tax structure is given in Table 2. Figure 3 compares the 1998 and 2002 tax functions in 
terms of net income for a taxpayer with dependant spouse and two children. In what follows, the 
2002 Financial Law income tax changes, which are not revenue neutral, will be introduced first 
in the model.  
 
2.3. The linear income tax hypothesis  
 
We will also consider a hypothetical reform consisting in the introduction of a linear 
income tax with a negative component. Given a tax liability R, gross hourly wage  w ~  and h 
hours of labour supply, such that: 
G h w t R − − = ~ ) 1 ( ; 
this exercise will choose the marginal tax rate t and a minimum guaranteed income G so that 
revenue neutrality will be satisfied.  
  5 
 
Table 1: Description of the 1998 Italian tax- benefit system  
Taxable income from: 
- employment  
- self employment  
- business and unincorporated companies  
- real estate  
Tax unit: individual  
Tax schedule 
 Income  brackets  Rates 
  0 – 7,747  0.19 
  7,748 - 15,493  0.27 
  15,494 - 30,987  0.34 
  30,988 - 69,722  0.40 
 >  69,722  0.46 
Tax relieves 
- decreasing tax credit for employment income  
     maximum amount: 868  
     minimum amount: 52 (for incomes over 51,646) 
- decreasing tax credit for dependent spouse 
     maximum amount: 546  
     minimum amount: 422 (for incomes over 51,646) 
- fixed tax credit for each child 
     amount: 173 
Rates of social security contribution* 
Employer Employee 
White collar  Blue collar  White collar  Blue collar 
33.52 34.74  10.19  9.19 
Note: * for the employer, net of the special regimes of incentives 
("fiscalizzazione degli oneri sociali"). Nominal variables in Euro per 
year.  6 
 
Table 1.a Description of the 1998 Italian tax- benefit system: Child Benefits Schedule 
Income brackets  Number of children 
    1 2 3 4  5+ 
0  10304  130.66 250.48 358.94 492.18 619.75 
10305  12751  114.65 220.53 339.83 481.34 600.64 
12752  15198  92.45 190.57 312.97 473.07 584.11 
15199  17643  65.59 158.04 283.02 453.97 565.00 
17644  20090  43.90 111.55 241.70 407.48 507.68 
20091  22537  25.82  81.60 217.43 390.96 488.57 
22538  24984  15.49  57.33 176.63 364.10 466.88 
24985  27430  15.49  38.73 135.83 339.31 439.50 
27431  29876  12.91  25.82 102.77 317.62 426.08 
29876  32322  12.91 25.82 91.93  225.18  398.70 
32323  34769  12.91 23.24 91.93  154.42  292.83 
34770 37216    23.24 78.50  154.42  218.98 
37216 39663    23.24 78.50  132.21  218.98 
39663 42109     78.50 132.21 189.02 
42110 44556      132.21 189.02 
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Figure 2: Italian tax and benefit system 
Note: reference household is single person with a dependent child and gross 
hourly wage of 10.24 Euro. 
 
 
Table 2: The 2002 Income Tax structure 
 
Tax schedule 
  Income brackets  Tax Rates 
  0 – 10,328  0.18 
  10,328 - 15,493  0.24 
  15,494 - 30,987  0.32 
  30,988 - 69,722  0.39 
 >  69,722  0.45 
Tax relieves 
- decreasing tax credit for employment income  
     maximum amount: 1146  
     minimum amount: 52 (for incomes over 51,646) 
- decreasing tax credit for not working spouse 
     maximum amount: 546  
     minimum amount: 422 (for incomes over 51,646) 
- decreasing tax credit for each child 
     maximum amount: 516 
     minimum amount:  285 (for incomes over 51,646)   
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Figure 3: Net income under 1998 and 2002 tax structures 
Note: Reference group: household with dependent spouse and two children. 
 
 
3. Tax reform, labour supply and intra-household allocation of resources: 
empirical specification and identification strategy 
 
The initial papers of Chiappori (1988 and 1992) define a collective model as the one 
where resources are always allocated according to the Pareto criterion and final outcomes are 
Pareto efficient. Formally, in a two member household each individual  f m j i , = ≠  defines his 
own consumption bundle and leisure demand by solving the following Pareto optimality 
problem: 
()
() y T w w l w l w c
y u c l U t s
c l U
f m f f m m
j j j j
i i i
+ + ≤ + +
≥ z d w z
z
, , , ) , , ( . .
) , , ( max
     (1) 
In (1) the two individuals m and f have egoistic preferences over consumption c
i (with c= c
i + c
j) 
and leisure time l
i and, as in the simplest case, externalities and household public goods are 
excluded from the analysis. T, w
i and y indicate respectively total individual available time, net 
wage rate and household non labour income, whereas z is a vector of demographic variables 
which affects preferences and d are extra variables called distributional factors, since they only 
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Problem (1) allows individual i to maximise his utility, assuring j a level of 
j u  and 
meeting the aggregate budget constraint, which includes labour and non-labour earnings. The 
distribution of individual welfare that the final aggregate bundle will satisfy,  
() () [ ] z d w z d w , , , , , , , y u y u
f m , 
is assumed as an exogenous function of wages, non-labour income, and the distributional 
factors.  
The framework in (1) can be used to introduce non-participation and a non-linear budget 
constraint into the analysis, as shown in studies by Blundell at al. (2001) and Donni (2002), 
respectively. But, their approaches cannot deal with a non convex budget set, which is an effect 
of the Italian tax and benefit system. Therefore, instead of deriving a structural model and fully 
estimating it, we follow a composite approach of econometrics and calibration techniques that 
allows us to reproduce a collective behaviour with minimal discrepancy from the Italian 
household data set, as later clarified.  
First of all, we treat labour supply as a discrete choice. This simplification already proved 
its usefulness in the unitary setting (see among others van Soest, 1995) when non linear taxes 
and participation have to be incorporated in the analysis. As usual the labour supply equation is 
introduced in the theoretical model (1) by adding a time constraint, such that 
i i l T h − = . 
Also, we assume that individual preferences have an extended Stone Geary specification, 
i.e. for i=m, f: 
 
() ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) z l l z l l z l l z c c U




i − − + − + − = log log log log δ β β     (2) 
 
where the extension concerns a leisure interaction term, capturing complementarity in leisure 
sharing for couples or substitution in market/non market use of time, as household production is 
not explicitly modelled here.
 2 Note that preferences as in (2) are non separable in the use of 
time and thus are more general than egoistic or “caring” usually analysed in the collective 
framework. The variables 
i i l c ,  stands for the “subsistence” or minimum requirement of 
individual consumption and leisure time and, as explained later, they both will capture the 
equivalent costs and minimum caring tasks in the presence of children. 
In order to identify all the parameters of the model we follow a two-step procedure. First, 
we estimate classical LES preferences on a sample of singles in Italy. In other words, we 
assume that in a one-person households, choices over total consumption and leisure satisfy the 
maximisation of  
 





i − + − = log log β β    i=m, f    (3) 
subject to a constraint: 
( )
i i i i i y w l g c φ , , , =       ( 4 )  
defining disposable income for any given 
i φ , a function of the Italian personal tax system and 
of individual characteristics. Note that the introduction of tax reforms will alter the function g(.). 
Secondly, under the basic assumption that individuals do not change their preferences when 
they get married apart from the extra leisure term, the parameters estimated in the previous step 
                                                 
2 The extended Stone Geary preferences are well-behaved, if  0 >
i
c β  and  [ ] 0 log > − +
j j i i
l l l δ β  with 
f m j i , = ≠ .   10 
will be used for the sample of couples, and the bargaining power and the leisure interaction term 
δ  will be calibrated.
 3 
Given the non convexity in the household budget set raised by the Italian tax system, the 
Pareto frontier is not necessarily concave (see for proofs MasCollel et al., 1995). Therefore 
instead of maximising a social welfare function derived from the household problem (1), we 
implement a procedure that, moving along the Pareto frontier, searches for the point which is 
closest to the observed behaviour.
 4 The steps followed here are four: 
1.  We first define for any given leisure interaction term δ  the minimum (the maximum) 
utility level a man can reach in all combinations of spouses’ labour supplies when the 
woman receives the maximum (the minimum) consumption level. 
 
2.  We then select K+1 points along the Pareto frontier and define: 
()




U U min max min − + =    for k=0,…,K   (5) 
where the ratio  ω =
K
k
 defines the man’s bargaining power. 
 
3.  For a given ω  the wife maximises her utility subject to the household budget 
constraint, the man’s utility level being equal 
m
k U . 
 
4.  Given the choice bundle 
f m m f c c l l , , , , which is function of () δ ω, , the value for ω  
and δ  are then selected according to the following criterion: 
() [] () []
2 * 2 *
,





f h h h h − + −      (6) 
where 
* * , m f h h  indicate respectively the observed husband’ and wife’s labour supply. 
 
The procedure described above is based on the underlying assumption that the leisure 
interaction parameter δ  is the same for men and women. Successively, the simplification can 
be removed once the bargaining power ω  is regressed on a set of income variables, as well as 
on distributional factors d. Given the predicted values for ω , a new calibration procedure can 
be implemented in order to obtain the values for 
m δ  and 
f δ  according to:  
() [] () []
2 * 2 *
,
, , min f m m
m
f m f
f h h h h
f m δ δ δ δ
δ δ
− + −     (7). 
 
                                                 
3 A similar assumption is also made in Barmby and Smith (2001). 
4 This procedure was jointly developed by D. Beninger, F. Laisney and F. Vermeulen.  11 
4. The Data Set 
 
The data set used in this study is the 1998 Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW). This is the most comprehensive survey of micro data on income and 
wealth in Italy, covering the socio-economic status, labour and non-labour income and wealth of 
more than 8,000 Italian households (24,000 individuals). Started in 1977 and re-designed in 
1987, SHIW provides detailed information on a representative sample of the whole Italian 
population. Moreover it has a rotating panel component (about 40% of the sample) and the last 
three surveys refer to 1993, 1995 and 1998. 
From the 1998 survey a sub-sample of individuals between 25 and 55 years old was 
selected, composed by either employees or non-employed. People still in education, 
unemployed, self-employed and retired are not considered in the current study.  
Even though household composition in Italy changed considerably during the 
eighties/nineties due to the increase in the number of single persons and the decline in fertility, 
still a peculiarity of the Italian demographic structure is a relatively high percentage of young 
adults (compared to other European countries) that tends to live with their parents well beyond 
the age of 25, owing to higher unemployment and more difficult access to independent living 
arrangements. As the phenomenon of co-residence of relatively mature young adults with their 
parents would require a more complex model of intra-household decision, a further selection 
was necessary and households with children over age 25 were discarded.  
However, due to small sample size, the sample of singles had to be enlarged. This was 
done by carefully matching non panel observations from the two previous SHIW surveys (1993 
and 1995). Thus, the female sample size is 233 (75 observations from 1998, 64 from 1995, 94 
from 1993 surveys), whereas the male sample size is 250 (77 observations from 1998, 84 from 
1995, 89 from 1993 surveys). Nominal variables from the 1993 and 1995 surveys have been 
inflated to 1998 values (ISTAT CPI) and before tax income has been imputed considering 
respectively the 1993 and 1995 tax schedule.
 The main demographic characteristics of the two 
samples of one-person households are described in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
5 Given 
our selection criteria, men and women with college degree and residing in the North-West are 
over-represented. A consequence of both educational and geographical characteristics might 
also be that the female participation rate (82%) is remarkably higher than the national female 
participation rate (around 40%), as living in the North-West provides higher job opportunities 
but also higher living standards compared to the rest of the country. Concerning marital status, 
68% of single men (women) never married, the remaining are separated, widowed or divorced. 
The main income source is on average labour earnings, whereas weekly unearned income 
includes return from financial investments and income from transfers, which can both assume 
negative values. On average a single man has higher non labour income than a single woman. 
Figures 4 and 5 display histograms of weekly hours for each sample of singles, with peaks at 0 
and at 40 hours in both cases. 
                                                 
5 All nominal variables are in Euro.  12 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for single men 
 no.  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
(1) Individual Characteristics           
Age  250 39.48  8.67  25  55 
Education:   250     
Primary school    .12    
Secondary school   .44    0  1 
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees   .43    0  1 
Geographical area:  250     
North-west   .42    0  1 
North-east   .20    0  1 
Centre   .20    0  1 
South   .09    0  1 
Islands   .08    0  1 
Marital  status:  250     
Married separated   .02    0  1 
Never married   .68    0  1 
Divorced   .29    0  1 
Widow   .02    0  1 
(2) Employment characteristics           
Participation  250 .92    0  1 
Weekly hours of work   233 35.90 11.95  6  60 
Net hourly wage   232 7.70 4.03 1.04  29.80 
Gross hourly wage   232 9.57 6.48 1.04  49.62 
(3) Weekly unearned income   250  102.31  150.75  -108.26  1452.10 
Income from transfers   3.11  46.62  -238.36  387.34 
Capital income   93.29  127.70  -34.85  1064.76 
Note: Weekly unearned income includes capital income from housing rent (effective or imputed), from 
financial capital (interests from portfolios or paid) and income from transfers, pensions and maintenance 
paid and received (social benefits from Welfare State). All nominal variables are in Euro. 
 
 
The sample of couples selected from the 1998 survey is composed of 1,717 households 
with one- or two-generations only (couples with or without children). In Tables 5.a, 5.b and 5.c 
the main households and individual characteristics can be found. The geographical distribution 
of the sample units is much more balanced compared to singles and nearly half of the 
households have at least two children.  
Except for a few observations, all husbands work, most of them full time, as shown in 
Figure 6, whereas only 53% of the married women participate in the labour market. Their labour 
supply is more dispersed than for men (see Figure 7).  
In principle we could even observe in the SHIW individual non labour income, as shown 
in Table 5.b and 5.c. However, for most observations in the sample, female unearned income is 
a rather small portion of the entire household income, and it does not seem to provide any 
relevant piece of information on the household redistribution mechanism. Note also that income 
from transfers are either transfers from the welfare state, including child benefits, or allowances 
received from or addressed to other relatives; for the latter reason they can assume negative 
values. As child benefits appear in the SHIW as a form of unearned income, we do not consider 
them as labour earning component in the analysis of the tax reforms, even though their amount 
does depend on labour incomes, as shown in Table1.a.   13 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for single women 
 no.  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
(1)  Individual  Characteristics       
Age  233  41.89  9.12 25 55 
Education:        
Primary school  233  .16    
Secondary school  233  .43     0 1 
Univ. and post-grad. degrees  233  .39   0 1 
Geographical area:       
North-west  233  .43   0 1 
North-east  233  .20   0 1 
Centre  233  .17   0 1 
South  233  .13   0 1 
Islands  233  .06   0 1 
Marital  status:       
Married separated  233  .02   0 1 
Never married  233  .68   0 1 
Divorced  233  .29   0 1 
Widow  233  .02   0 1 
(2)  Employment  Characteristics       
Participation  233  .82   0 1 
Weekly hours of work   192 35.31  9.54  7  60 
Net hourly wage  191 7.29 3.74 0.66  27.68 
Gross hourly wage   191    8.50 4.78 0.66  31.33 
(3) Weekly unearned income     81.01  110.43  -259.87  725.22 
Income from transfers  233 14.99 52.52  -397.27  262.20 
Capital income  233 65.00 93.92  -69.17  725.22 

















single man weekly work. hours





















































































































































































































































































































single woman weekly work. hours

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.a: Descriptive statistics for couples 
 no.  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
(1)  Household    Characteristics       
Household without children (a)  182  0.11    
Number of children: (a)  1535 1.88 0.79  1  7 
With 1 child   474  0.27   0 1 
With 2 children  803  0.47   0 1 
3 or more   258  0.17   0 1 
No. children aged 0-2  1535 0.16 0.40  0  3 
No. children aged 3-6  1535 0.25 0.48  0  2 
No. children aged 7-12  1535 0.45 0.63  0  3 
No. children aged 13-18  1535 0.54 0.70  0  4 
No. children aged 19-25  1535 0.48 0.76  0  4 
Geographical area:         
North-west  1717  .24   0 1 
North-east  1717  .18   0 1 
Centre  1717  .21   0 1 
South  1717  .26   0 1 
Islands  1717  .11   0 1 
(2)  Weekly  unearned  income       
Total weekly unearned income (a)  1667 140.85 156.12  -1285.84  2526.46 
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Table 5.b: Individual statistics for husbands  
 no.  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
(1) Individual Characteristics           
Age 1717  43.08  7.16  25  55 
Education:         
Primary school  1717  .46    
Secondary school  1717 .43    0  1 
Univ. and post-grad. degrees  1717 .10    0  1 
(2) Employment Characteristics           
Participation  1717 .997    0  1 
Weekly hours of work   1712 39.91    6.86  5  60 
Net hourly wage   1696 8.04 3.95 1.99  45.52 
Gross hourly wage   1696 10.24  5.83  1.99 68.29 
(3) Weekly unearned income (a)  1667  99.50  123.13  -164.11  2377.48 
Income from transfers  1717 2.73  27.93  -198.64  536.32 
Capital income  1717 93.88  119.10  -55.22  2377.48 
Note: see Table 1. 




Table 5.c: Individual statistics for wives 
 no.  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
(1) Individual Characteristics           
Age 1717  39.85  7.29  25  55 
Education:         
Primary  school  1717  .46    
Secondary school  1717  .41    0  1 
Univ. and post-grad. degrees  1717  .11    0  1 
(2) Employment Characteristics           
Participation 1717  .53    0  1 
Weekly hours of work   916  32.87   9.25  5  60 
Net hourly wage   893  7.41  3.51  0.86  35.8 
Gross hourly wage   893  9.03  4.59  0.86  43.19 
(3) Weekly unearned income (a)  1667  9.20  38.34  -62.25  477.66 
Income from transfers  1717  1.15  11.78  -59.59  278.09 
Capital income  1717  7.78  36.14  -62.25  477.66 
Note: see Table 1. 
(a) The number of observations with positive values is reported.   
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Figure 7: Wives weekly working hours in the sample of couples 
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5. Empirical specifications and results  
 
5.1 Estimation of wage equations  
 
In order to obtain predicted wage rates for the whole sample, including those non 
working, we estimate equations for gross wages for both men and women, for singles and 
couples separately. 
For singles we tried several estimation methods (two-step Heckman OLS method, 
Heckman with maximum likelihood and two step with a simpler correction than the hazard 
function). Table 6 contains results of the one that provided the most accurate predictions for 
those working: we used the two-step OLS Heckman procedure for men’s wages and an ML 
method for women’s wages. In both regressions the identification of the selection process is 
ensured by gross unearned income, significant in both participation equations. The wage 
equations include also age and its squared value, educational and geographical dummies and a 
constant term. Age variables are significantly different from zero only in men’s wage estimation 
and higher education increases the wage level, as expected, in both cases. Geographical 
dummies, having as reference category the North with higher job opportunities, appear all with 
a negative sign. 
In estimating wages for men and women in couples, in principle, we should take account 
of the selection mechanism for participation arising in a collective model (as in Blundell et al., 
2001), which might turn out difficult to be developed in our framework. However, husbands are 
all working in our sample except for very few observations. As far as the woman is concerned, 
Lewbel (2000) proposes an alternative econometric method which does not require the 
specification of the selection mechanism, but still corrects  for selection bias with a 2SLS 
estimator. We use the simplest form of Lewbel’s estimator. Among several other estimation 
techniques, including also two-step OLS Heckman and ML method, Lewbel’s estimator 
provides the most accurate predictions of women’s gross wage rates.  
Tables 8 and 9 contain the empirical results of estimations and predictions referred to all 
sample. 
  18 
 
Table 6: Estimated wage equations for singles 
Variables    men    women   
  Coef.  Std. er.  t-value  Coef.  Std. er.  t-value 
Age  2.01 0.59 3.43 0.28    0.49 0.57 
Age
2  -0.23  0.07 -3.20 -0.02  0.06 -0.38 
Educ. Dummy: Secondary school  0.17  0.09  1.85  0.24  0.18  1.35 
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees  1.57  0.28  5.51  0.61  0.19  3.29 
Geographical Dummies: Centre  -0.13  0.08  -1.66  -0.27   0.11   -2.40 
                              South  -0.46  0.14  -3.18  -0.02   0.12  -0.17 
Islands  -0.56  0.19 -2.93 -0.03    0.12 -0.24 
Constant    -2.04 0.95  -2.16 1.06    0.90 1.18 
Lambda  -0.24 0.07  -3.51 0.30    0.22 1.39   
(Uncensored) obs.    232      189   
   2 R =0.32     LogL=-193.68  
Note: The table contains results of a two-step OLS Heckman procedure for men’s wages and a maximum 
likelihood method for women’s wages. In both cases the dependent variable is the logarithmic 




Table 7: Estimated gross hourly wages for singles  
Variable  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min max 
m w   250 9.63 4.69 7.35 9.79  14.52 5.32  66.59 
f w   233 8.18 2.45 6.64 8.45  12.19 3.91  14.55 
Note: In the table predicted values obtained from single men and women’s wages. Predictions refer to all 
observations, including non workers. They have been imputed taking account of the estimated variance 
of the log wage.  
 




Table 8: Estimated wage equations for couples 
Variables   men      women   
  coef.  std. er.  t-value  coef.  std. er.  t-value 
Age  0.04  0.02  2.28  -0.09   
Age
2  -0.00  0.00  -1.68  0.00   
Educ. Dummy: Secondary school  0.26  0.02  13.59  0.25     
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees  0.62  0.04  17.52  0.50     
No. children aged 0-2  _  _  _  0.12     
No. children aged 3-6  _  _  _  -0.05     
No. children aged 7-12  _  _  _  -0.05     
No. children aged 13-16  _  _  _  0.21     
Geographical Dummies: Centre  -0.08  0.02  -3.25  0.01     
South  -0.16  0.02    -6.66  0.15   
Islands  -0.08  0.04  -2.05  -0.05   
Constant   1.14  0.32  3.58   3.44     
(Uncensored)  obs.    1696    893  
   Adj.
2 R =0.25     LogL=-189.22  
Note: The table contains results of an OLS procedure for men’s wages (robust standard errors) and a 
Lewbel (2000) method for women’s wages. The variance of the Lewbel estimator is still to be computed 




Table 9: Estimated gross hourly wages for couples 
Variable  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min  max 
m w   1717  10.14 2.41 7.74 9.49  12.84 6.00  18.16 
f w   1717 8.20 1.87 6.01 7.92  10.72 4.76  18.76 
Note: In the table predicted values obtained from men and women’s wages using the sample of couples. 
Predictions refer to all observations, including non workers. They have been imputed taking account of 
the estimated variance of the log wage. 
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5. 2 Estimation of preferences and simulation of singles’ behaviour  
 
This section discusses the econometric method and the results obtained in the estimation 
of singles’ preferences assumed of the Stone–Geary form as earlier specified in equation (3).  
In order to adequately control for population heterogeneity, we use a mixed multinomial 
logit model with two mass points on the consumption coefficients that capture unobserved 
heterogeneity, following the method described in Hoynes (1996)
6. Moreover, we suppose that 
each individual can choose K different categories of labour supply, since we discretize the 
individual working time. As a consequence, leisure time is discretized, with 
k k h T l − = . We 
specify T=168 total weekly hours available and we consider  {} 50 , 40 , 30 , 20 , 0 ∈
i h  and K=5, the 
number of categories labour supplies can take. We disregard the categories 10 and 60 due to too 
few observations (as Figures 3 and 4 indicate).  
Thus, the contribution of person i choosing ( )
s s
i l c ,  to the likelihood function is:  
 




























l l c c








π      (8) 
where mp is the number of mass points (mp=2) and  p π is the probability associated with each 
mass point (or regime). To ensure that the two probabilities add up to 1, we adopt the following 
parametrization:  
() () [] 1 1 1 exp 1 / exp e e + = π      (9) 
 
1 2 1 π π − = . 
 
The subsistence levels for consumption and leisure in the Stone-Geary preference 
function are derived as follows. In order not to produce infinite disutility, in (3) we consider 
i i i c c c 0
~ − =  (with i=m, f) where 
i c ~  is the lowest disposable income (maximum potential 
dissaving) obtainable over all possible labour supplies in the sample and 
i c
0 is found by grid 
search (specifically  2
0 =
m c  and  5 . 1
0 =
f c ). The value 
i c ~  for single men is set at -110.26, a 
unique value for the whole sample; for single women labour supply estimates remarkably 
improved when 
i c ~  was differentiated according to whether women had a degree (-261.37) or 
not (-70.67). Minimum leisure 
i l  is instead fixed according to the average value for minimum 
time of physiological regeneration (sleeping time, household production and time for self care) 
reported in the 1995 Time Use Survey from Multiscopo
7. The weekly hours of minimum leisure 
for a single man aged 25-55 is 82 and for a single woman 88. 
                                                 
6 In a preliminary searching procedure, we also estimated a random parameter multinomial logit (see Mc 




i β β , . However, the 
variance of the consumption term only was found significant. The specification with mass points of 
support on the consumption coefficient proved to be preferable to the RPL according to the LR statistics 
and in terms of accuracy in predictions. 
7 For a description of the Multiscopo survey see Perali (1999).   21 
In Tables 10 and 11 the ML estimation results based on equation (8) are reported. They 
have been obtained using analytical gradients and Hessian. The last two rows of each table 
reports the log-likelihood obtained from a standard multinomial logit and the one with two mass 
points. In both cases a LR test easily rejects the multinomial logit model.  
An interpretation of the sign and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is not easy, 
as both the propensities to consume and to demand leisure appear in a non linear form. Marginal 
propensities are instead computed and reported in Table 12 for single men and single women. In 
both cases the propensity to consume is, on average, slightly higher than the propensity to 
demand leisure. Also in both estimates the mass point with the higher value is the one with the 
highest probability. 
In order to compute the elasticities we use the marginal propensities in Table 12 and we 
linearise the budget constraint at the observed hours for each individual. Results are included in 
Tables 13 and 14. The price and wage elasticities are consistent with existing literature, whereas 





Table 10: Estimation of preferences – single men  
Variables   Coef.  Std.  Error  t-value 
m
l0 β   ( )
m m l l − log   22.61  5.06  4.47 
m
l1 β   ( )
m m l l − log × South  1.85  2.00  0.93 
m
c0 β   ( )
m m c c − log × high education  2.57  2.13  1.20 
m
c1 β    ( )
m m c c − log × regime 1  39.15  8.03  4.87 
m
c2 β   ( )
m m c c − log × regime 2  8.60  2.49  3.45 
1 e   “logit” regime 1  2.09  0.29  7.23 
No obs. × K     250×5   
Log Likelihood with mp=2    -309.57   
Log likelihood multinomial logit    -344.79   
Note: The table contains results of a mixed multinomial logit regression with two mass points of 
support capturing unobserved heterogeneity as in Hoynes (1996). The variables South and High 
Education are geographical and educational dummies, respectively. 
 
                                                 
8  The LES should yield positive wage elasticities of labour supply, negative price elasticities of 
consumption, positive income elasticities of consumption, and negative income elasticities of labour 
supply. This is not always the case here and this is due to the fact that the virtual unearned income 
obtained in linearising the budget constraint is in a few cases lower than 
i c . 
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Table 10.a: Estimation and prediction of regimes’ probabilities -single men  
Probabilities  Estimated  probability  Frequencies 
1 π   regime 1  0.89  0.88 
2 π   regime 2  0.11  0.12 
Note: The table contains results of the estimated probability and frequencies of 
each regime. Frequencies correspond to the regime which gives the best 
prediction in labour supply. 
 
 
Table 11: Estimation of preferences – single women 
Variables   Coef.  Std.  Error  t-value 
f
l0 β   ( )
f f l l − log   15.70 3.61 4.35 
f
l1 β   ( )
f f l l − log × South  1.44 1.44 1.00 
f
c0 β   ( )
f f c c − log × high education  9.66 2.45 3.94 
f
c1 β    ( )
f f c c − log × regime 1  30.13 6.52 4.62 
f
c2 β   ( )
f f c c − log × regime 2  4.25 1.39 3.05 
1 e   “logit” regime 1  0.71  0.18  3.90 
No obs. × K     233×5   
Log Likelihood with mp=2    -341.73   
Log likelihood multinomial logit    -362.54   




Table 11.a: Estimation and prediction of regimes’ probabilities -single women  
Probabilities   Estimated  probability  Frequencies 
1 π   regime 1  0.67 0.65 
2 π   regime 2  0.33 0.31 
Note: See Table 10.a. 
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Table 12: Marginal propensities  
  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min max 
m
c B   250 0.60 0.11 0.33 0.63 0.65 0.26 0.65 
m
l B   250 0.40 0.11 0.35 0.37 0.67 0.35 0.74 
f
c B   233 0.58 0.18 0.21 0.66 0.72 0.20 0.72 
f
l B   233 0.42 0.18 0.28 0.34 0.79 0.28 0.80 









j B β β β + = /  with i=m,f and j=c,l. 
 
 
Table 13: Estimated elasticities for single men  
 no.  mean  std  dev  min  max 
Price elasticity (c)  249 -1.58  1.90  -29.23 -1.03 
Wage elasticity (h)  234 0.48 0.53  -0.08 5.06 
Income elasticity of 
consumption (c) 
249 3.09 3.93 1.39  59.66 
Income elasticity of 
labor supply (h) 
234 -2.01  2.04  -24.35 -0.76 




Table 14 Estimated elasticities for single women 
 no.  mean  std  dev  min  max 
Price elasticity (c)  231  -2.06 6.39  -92.63 0.48 
Wage elasticity (h)  192 0.58 0.51  -0.14 4.80 
Income elasticity of 
consumption (c) 
231 4.49  13.25  -2.89  192.28 
Income elasticity of 
labor supply (h) 
192  -2.02 1.77  -19.41 0.10 
Note: see note Table 13. 
 
 
In predicting the optimal labour supply for each single we choose the regime which gives  
the best prediction and in case of indifference the point which yields the normalised marginal 
propensity to consume closest to 0.5. Predictions computed (in columns) are compared with 
actual discretised labour supply (in rows) in Tables 15 and 16. The 65% of the sample of single 
men is predicted correctly, moreover the remaining 35% are predicted almost with an error of 
only 10 hours. The quality of the predictions for single women is similar, as 66% of the 
observations appears in the diagonal and the remaining with a minimal difference. 
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Table 15: Actual vs. predicted labour supply- Sample of single men 
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  15  1     16 
20   10  2 4    16 
30   4  2  6   12 
40   1  17  129  27 174 
50   1  4  21  6  32 
Total 15  17  25  160  33  250 
 
 
Table 16: Actual vs. predicted labour supply- Sample of single women 
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  37  4     41 
20   20  4 9    33 
30   3  2  16   21 
40   2  13  92  14 121 
50   1  4  10  2  17 
Total 37  30  23  127  16  233 
 
 
6. Calibration of the sharing rule and simulation of couple’s behaviour  
 
As already discussed in Section 3, preferences for married individuals are based on the 
estimations obtained from the single samples, under the basic assumption that individuals do not 
change their preferences when they get married except for an extra term which captures the 
substitutability or complementarity in leisure time (or home production) especially when pre-
school children are present in a household. This identifying assumption will allow us to 
calibrate two parameters, the bargaining power ω  and a unique leisure interaction term δ  for 
each couple, in the first place. Then after regressing ω  on several relevant distributional 
factors, it will be possible to calibrate two individual 
i δ , with i=m,f.  









− =  (with i=m, f and r=1,…,9) where 
i c ~ is the lowest disposable income 
(maximum potential dissaving) derived over all possible labour supplies in the sample, 
i c
0 is 
fixed at 2. This avoids, as before, an infinite disutility. henr is the household equivalent number 
with  r household components, based on ISE (see Table 17). ISE is the equivalence scale, 
computed since 1998 by the Italian Department of Welfare for the construction of an “Indicator 
of Economic Conditions” (ISE – Indicatore della Situazione Economica) to be employed in a 
number of means tested social programs. The lowest value for 
i c ~  was found at -82.06 and it 
corresponds to a household with two children (i.e. four household components). Therefore for 
each observation with r children we rescale the value 
i c ~  with the ratio henr/hen4  ,  thus 
computing an individual equivalent disposable income.   25 
Table 17: ISE Equivalence Scale 




Note: Italian Welfare Department Equivalence Scale 
(ISE). Increase of 0.35 for each additional member. 
Increase of 0.2 in the case of mono-parental family and 
under age children. 
 
 
The minimum leisure is fixed at 82 for men and 88 for women with no children or with 
children older than 12 years, as for singles. However, in order to account for minimum needs of 
extra household productions in the presence of children under age 12, we added extra time 
depending on the number of children living in the household. This extra time is computed 
according to the average values found in the Multiscopo survey for each corresponding case. In 
particular, we add 9 (4) hours to women (men) minimum leisure time, if less than 6 years old 
children were present in the household and 7 (2) hours in case of kids aged between 6 and 12. 
Following the four steps described in Section 2 we choose the bundle ( )
f m p p , , ,δ ω , i.e. 
the bargaining power, the leisure interaction term and the probabilities for each individual 
regime (or mass point), which satisfies the criterion: 
() [] () []
2 * 2 *
, , ,






p p h h p p h h
f m δ ω δ ω
δ ω
− + −     (10) 
under the initial condition that leisure interaction terms are identical for the couple. We only 
search values for δ in the range [-3,-2.5,-2…,3]. The program loops around the starting values 
of 0 for δ  and 0.5 for ω . In case of multiple solutions, we select the value for δ  closest to 0, 
the value for ω  closest to 0.5 and the regime with higher probabilities in the single estimations. 
Results of the calibration procedure are contained in Tables 18 and 19 and in Figure 8. 
The mean value for δ  is –2.10, and for ω  0.38. The negative value found for the leisure 
interaction term is hardly justifiable from an economic point of view; it might be due to the fact 
that the “leisure” of the woman includes hours of home work in the specification here used. So 
she seems to have a higher utility than is really the case. If that is true, then only time use 
surveys could prevent us from facing this inconvenient. It might well also be that δ  is here 
bearing all the weight of the two simplifying assumptions made on couples’ preferences, 
specifically that they could easily be expressed by singles’ preferences and that there is a unique 
leisure interaction term for husbands and wives. Later on, removing the latter simplifying 
assumption will improve this result. 
 
 
Table 18: Leisure interaction effect and power index 
 no.  mean  std  dev  min  max 
δ   1717 -2.10  0.99  -  3  3 
ω   1717 0.38 0.18    0.02 0.99 
  26 
Table 18.a: Leisure interaction effect and power index by number of children 
  No children  1 child  2 children 
 
3 (more) children 
δ   -2.16 -2.20 -2.08  -1.92   
ω   0.41   0.39   0.38   0.35  
no.  182 474 803  258 
Note: In the table mean value only is reported for each case. 
 
Table 19: Regime frequencies for couples  
  regime 1  regime 2 
m p   0.76 0.24 






Figure 8: Power index and couple’s educational level  
Note: In figure (a) neither wife nor husband have high education (first degree and post-graduate 
studies); in (b) wife only has high education; in (c) husband only has high education and in (d) both 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18.a also describes the mean values of δ  and ω  for different household 
compositions. The leisure interaction term slightly increases in absolute value with 1 child, but 
it decreases as the number of children further raises. A plausible explanation for this effect is 
that children, especially when at school age, can be of help to parents in child care. However,  
this interpretation does not result from the model, rather from the literature on child care. The 
bargaining power instead seems to be in favour of the woman as the number of children 
increases. Figure 8 shows how a (high) educational level of husband and wife affects the 
distribution of the bargaining power. In particular, when the spouses differ in their educational 
level (Figure 8.b and 8.c), it is likely that the more educated partner ends up having a higher 
bargaining power. 
Table 19 reports the frequencies of the two regimes, estimated in the samples of singles, 
when applied to individuals in couples. For both husband and wife the first regime is the most 
selected; this result is also consistent with what found in the sample of singles. 
Tables 20 and 21 compare the calibrated labour supply (in columns) with the actual 
discretised working hours (in rows). The prediction is rather accurate, as nearly 98% of the 




Table 20: Actual vs. predicted labour supply using a collective model- Sample of men in 
couples  
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  5            5 
20 9  51      60 
30   7  45     52 
40     4  1252   1256 
50       6  338  344 
Total 14  58  49  1258  338  1717 
 
 
Table 21: Actual vs. predicted labour supply using a collective model - Sample of women 
in couples  
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  801       801 
20 17  196      213 
30   20  99     119 
40     10  530   540 
50       2  42  44 




6.1 Estimating the power index and recalibrating the leisure interaction terms 
 
In a collective model the power index, which attributes to each partner a given utility 
level for any budgetary situation, is not a constant, rather depends on income, prices and 
distributional factors, in an unspecified way. Finding the relevance and the sign of all the factors 
mentioned is a role left to the empirical work. This has been partly produced by the current  28 
literature so far and still needs to be further developed. An important contribution of the current 
research is the analysis of the impact that income taxes have on the power index in a couple. If 
we can find that the tax system, affecting the relative earning power of the couple, alters also the 
bargaining power, then we can prove that collective models provide a description of individual 
behaviour and welfare closer than unitary models to the real world. We compute two variables, 
namely  Yd20 and Yd40, capturing the way in which tax and benefit system affects the 
bargaining power in a couple, in the way that follows.  
If 
f
k n  and 
m
k n  are the frequencies of women and men, respectively, observed working  k h  
discretised hours, define 
0 fk
mk R  as the household disposable income when the husband works k 











k R R n Yf
1
0 20 20      (11). 
 
The expression in (11) computes the expected increase in household disposable earnings if the 
wife increases her labour supply from 0 to 20, i.e. from non-participation to part-time. Similarly 
Yf40 and Ym40 can be derived. Thus, Yd20 is defined as the ratio Yf20/Ym40  and  Yd40= 
Yf40/Ym40. Descriptive statistics for such distributional factors are contained in Table 22, which 
shows a lot of variation in the variables computed. 









log , is regressed on the ratios 
Yd20 and Yd40 and several demographic variables, such as the log of each spouse’s age, 
dummies for high educational level for each spouse, and the number of children. Results are 
reported in Table 23. Other variables, as geographical dummies, (household or individual) non 
labour income and a constant term were included in the searching procedure, but later excluded 
because not significantly different from 0.  
The number of children and the educational dummies appear with coefficients consistent 
in sign with the descriptive statistics: children reduce the man’s power index; having a high 
educational level positively affects one’s own bargaining power. Interestingly enough, both 
Yd20 and Yd40’ coefficients are significantly different from zero, however, they do appear with 
opposite sign. The woman’s power index is reduced when she begins to work part-time, 
possibly due to her now smaller role in home production combined with earnings that remain 
relatively low compared to those of the husband. The decision for the woman to participate as a 
full time worker, instead, significantly reduces the man’s power in the household. 
Table 24 compares the calibrated and the predicted bargaining power values: they are 
very close except for values at the tails.  
As the simulated labour supply obtained using the predicted values for ω  and the value 
for  δ  previously calibrated were not as accurate as those in Tables 20 and 21, we prefer to 
recalibrate the model, allowing for heterogeneity in individual δ  for each couple. After 
enlarging the range of investigation to [-4,...,3] with an increment of 1 for men and to [-4,...,3.5] 
with an increment of 0.5 for women, we obtain two new distributions for 
f m δ δ ,  (see Table 25 
and Figures 9 and 10), where now the negative values are substantially reduced as men’s cross 
leisure terms are skewed around 0, whereas women’s show in most cases complementarity in 
leisure time. 
The new predictions in labour supply are as accurate as the previous one: more than 95% 
of the sample is on the diagonal (see Tables 26 and 27).  
  29 
Table 22:  Distributional factors: descriptive statistics 
 no.  mean  std  dev  min  max 
Yf20  1717 127.81  49.37  14.00 570.81 
Yf40  1717 243.93  90.97  31.22  1063.40 
Ym40  1717 310.20 141.83  68.66  1625.45 
Yd20  1717 0.46 0.22 0.05 2.41 
Yd40  1717 0.88 0.40 0.11 4.50 
Note: Yfh (Ymh) is wife’s (husband’s) increase in the contribution to the household 
disposable income when she (he) switches the labour supply from 0 to h. 
Ydh=Yfh/Ym40 is her relative earning power at h hours. 
 
 
Table 23 Estimation results of husband’s power index 
Variables coef.  std.  error  t-value 
Yd40  -5.05 1.11  -4.54 
Yd20  7.97 2.05  3.88 
log (wife’s age)  0.61  0.26  2.36 
log (husband’s age)  -0.50  0.26  -1.96 
No. children  -0.09  0.02  -3.64 
Wife’s education: high  -0.79  0.08  -9.77 
Husband’s education: high  0.49  0.09  5.78 
No. observations    1717   
   AdjR
2=0.36   




Table 24 Calibrated and estimated power index 
  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50%  90%  min  max 
ω   1717 0.38 0.18 0.10 0.36  0.90 0.02  0.99 




We use the new calibrated data- set in the remaining two sections of the study for two 
main purposes: 1) to measure the bias produced when tax reforms are evaluated assuming a 
unitary rather than a collective model; 2) to simulate the changes in labour supply as well as in 
individual welfare, when the two tax reforms,  described in Section 2,  are implemented 
according to the collective model developed so far.  




Table 25 Husband’s and wife’s leisure interaction effects  
  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min max 
m δ   1717  -0.05 1.65  -3.00 0.00 2.00  -4.00 3.00 




Table 26: Actual vs. predicted labour supply using estimated power index ω ˆ  and 
calibrated individual leisure interaction effect  
m δ  and 
f δ  - Sample of men in couples  
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20  30 40 50  Total 
0  4  1            5 
20 4  49  6 1    60 
30   1  51  0  52 
40     28  1217  11 1256 
50       30  314  344 





Table 27: Actual vs. predicted labour supply using estimated power index ω ˆ  and 
calibrated individual leisure interaction effect  
m δ  and 
f δ  - Sample of women in 
couples 
     Predicted     
Actual  0 20  30 40 50  Total 
0  801        801 
20 16  195  2    213 
30   20  98  1   119 
40   5  27  507  1 540 
50       8  36  44 
Total  817 220  127 516  37  1717 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7. Comparing the analysis with a unitary model  
 
Before simulating behavioural changes due to tax reforms within the collective 
framework, we will try to measure the bias produced when unitary, rather than collective 
models are considered to evaluate future fiscal reforms. In order to provide a direct measure of 
the distortion, we specify a unitary model, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in a way 
similar to what previously done for the collective framework. We estimate the traditional model 
using the simulated data-set. Given the strong similarities in the procedures adopted, 
divergences in predicted behaviour can be attributed to model misspecification.  
We consider an extended Stone-Geary household utility function, as the following:   
 
( ) () () ( ) () () ( ) () () ( )
() () () () () z l l z l l z
z l l z z l l z z c c z l l c U







− + − + − =
log log
log log log , ,
δ
β β β
     (12) 
 
In (12) preferences are defined over total household disposable income and couple’s leisure 
terms, which appear in a non-separable form, similar to the one used in the collective model
9. 
The minimum requirements for consumption and leisure derived in the collective model are also 
included here. 
Given that each individual can still choose among K categories of labour supply, the 
household now has K
2  combinations of ( )
m f l l c , ,  to examine. Adding to (12) an error term, 
assumed independently and identically distributed as a type I extreme value, the probability that 
household i makes the choice k  equals: 
  
[] ( ) [ ]
() [] ∑ =








l l c U
l l c U
j k U U
1 , , exp
, , exp
, Pr . 
Moreover, two mass points on the household consumption coefficient will be added to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
Results are reported in Table 28. In the estimation, on the top of two mass points we also 
include dummies drawn on the regime chosen in the collective model, as in a preliminary 
checking they resulted highly significant (see Table 19). They further control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. All households display positive marginal utilities for consumption and individual 
leisure (see Table 29) and the estimated average value of 0.81 for the leisure interaction term 
mf δ is higher than those calibrated in the collective context. 
 
                                                 
9 See Beninger, Laisney and Beblo (2002) Appendix for the derivation of the conditions under which (12) 
is increasing in its arguments and concave.  33 
Table 28: Estimation of preferences – Unitary Model 
Variables   coef.  std.  error  t-value 
f
l0 β   ( )
f f l l − log   -11.41 0.74    -15.41 
f
l1 β   ( )
f f l l − log ×  regime
f 2  9.00 0.37  24.10 
f
l2 β   ( )
f f l l − log × wife medium educated  -1.61 0.14  -11.79 
f
l3 β   ( )
f f l l − log × wife highly educated  -0.57 0.32  -1.78 
m
l0 β   ( )
m m l l − log   -5.28 0.67  -7.88 
m
l1 β   ( )
m m l l − log × regime
m 1  -13.56 0.41  -33.18 
m
l2 β   ( )
m m l l − log × husband highly educated  3.45 0.32  10.78 
mf
0 δ   ( )
m m l l − log ×  ( )
f f l l − log   4.13 0.23  17.84 
mf
1 δ   ( )
m m l l − log ×  ( )
f f l l − log × log(wife’s age)  0.01 0.00  9.24 
mf
2 δ   ( )
m m l l − log ×  ( )
f f l l − log × no. children  0.39 0.03  15.15 
mf
3 δ   ( )
m m l l − log ×  ( )
f f l l − log × husband highly educated  -0.38 0.06  -6.18 
1 c β    ( ) c c − log × regime
m 1  9.72   0.95  10.20 
2 c β   ( ) c c − log × wife highly educated  35.52   1.50  23.62 
1 e   “logit” regime 1  -4.42 0.15  -28.72 
No obs. × K
2     1,717×25   
Log Likelihood with mp=2    -3868.71   
Log likelihood multinomial logit    -3903.17    
Note: The table contains results of a mixed multinomial logit regression with two mass points of support 
capturing unobserved heterogeneity as in Hoynes (1996). Regime
m 1, husband highly educated, wife 
highly or medium educated, regime




Table 28.a: Estimation and prediction of regimes’ probabilities –
couples using the unitary model  
Probabilities   Estimated  probability  Frequencies 
1 π   regime 1  0.01   0.02 
2 π   regime 2  0.98 0.97 
Note: See Table 10.a. 




Table 29: Marginal utilities and leisure interaction terms 
mf δ  
  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min max 
m
l MU   1717 5.99    5.51 2.10 3.15  15.84 0.82  19.25 
f
l MU   1717 12.35  4.50  8.09 10.41 19.62  5.30 21.22 
c MU   1717  16.55   11.21   9.84  9.84  35.52  9.84   39.43 




In producing predictions derived from the estimates of the unitary model, again we select 
for each observation the regime which gives the closest value to the observed one. Tables 30 
and 31 show that only 34% of predicted men working hours and 57% of women labour supplies 
are correct, a result markedly weaker than with the collective setting. The unitary model here 
estimated tends to smooth the distribution of labour supply; as a consequence only 301 men and 
123 women are predicted working at 40 hours, consistently with the collective predictions; but, 
both values are far below those found with the collective approach (1248 and 516, respectively). 
Moreover 13% of wives are predicted to be out of the labour market when instead they are 
observed  working full time. 
 
 
Table 30: Collective vs. unitary working hours with the 1998 tax schedule – men in couples  
     Unitary        
Collective  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  0     3   2   3   8 
20    0  3 18 30  51 
30   1 1  34 49  85 
40  1 17 67  301  862 1248 
50  1 2 5  39  278  325 
Total  2 20 79  394  1222  1717 
 
 
Table 31: Collective vs. unitary working hours with the 1998 tax schedule- women in couples 
     Unitary        
Collective  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  739  75 3      817 
20  80  79  32 15 14  220 
30  28 35 28  19 17  127 
40  63 103  75 123  152 516 
50  2 8 6 9  12  37 
Total  912 300 144 166 195  1717 
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8 Effects of Tax Reforms on Labour Supply and Welfare 
 
8.1 Positive aspects 
 
Once a collective framework has been built satisfactorily close to the observed behaviour, 
our interest moves on evaluating the effects of two tax reforms, namely the 2002 tax system and 
a linear income tax, on individual behaviour. 
The introduction of the 2002 tax changes compared to the 1998 tax schedule are not 
expected to be revenue neutral, due to both a reduction in tax rates and a relevant increase in tax 
credit for children and for employment income. All categories of households here considered 
(singles and couples with or without children) will likely benefit at least in terms of tax savings. 
The hypothetical linear tax system is instead built under the assumption of revenue neutrality. 
The unique marginal tax rate has been fixed at 0.44 whereas the minimum guaranteed income G 
at 3,000 Euro, with a small correction for couples with/ without children, such that they are 
entitled of an individual guaranteed income of 3,200 Euro. Those values are purely 
discretionary and more refined versions of a linear tax reform might be easily considered. 
However, the one here analysed satisfies overall the requirement of revenue neutrality, as shown 
in Table 32 (even though single men tax liabilities are higher compared to 1998, for the benefit 
of couples and single women). 
Both tax reforms have the effect of raising the woman’s bargaining power (see Table 33). 
This result is due to the fact that the first tax reform, compared to 1998 tax schedule, reduces tax 
liabilities at low income brackets and entitles of higher child tax credits households with 
children, whose internal distribution of power was already favouring the woman (see Table 
23).
10 With a linear tax system all non working women have a subsidy which again alters even 
more the within household income redistribution, due to the change in the individual 
contribution to total earnings. Figures 11 and 12 are consistent with this view, as they show that 
households with already smaller male bargaining power are the ones that witness a further 
reduction, whereas the very few cases with an increase in the power index ω ˆ  are those that 




Table 32: Tax revenue in million euro 
  1998 system  2002 reform  Linear income tax 
Single men  1.32  1.20  1.56 
Single women  0.69  0.60  0.57 
Couples   9.40  8.25  9.31 
Total 11.42  10.04  11.44 
Note: Tax revenues are computed using sampling weights. 
                                                 
10 For those with more than three children the credit is directly proportional to their number depending on 
income, with a maximum of 516 Euro per child.  36 
 
 
Table 33: Changes in bargaining power due to the fiscal reforms 
  no.  mean  std  dev 10% 50% 90%  min max 
ω ˆ   1717 0.37 0.09 0.25 0.37 0.46    0.04 0.70 
2002 ˆ ω   1717 0.28 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.45 0.01 0.76 
lin ω ˆ   1717 0.24 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.42 0.00 0.85 
Note: In the table the predicted values of the bargaining power computed with the 1998 income tax 
schedule, with the 2002 tax changes and with a revenue neutral linear income tax are compared. 
 




Figure  12: Power index pre and post reform: 1998 vs. linear  tax schedule 
wm_









Tables 34 to 37 compare women and men’ labour supply at the 1998 tax system and after 
the introduction of the 2002 tax changes, or with a linear income tax. Note, however, that the 
labour supplies derived from the two tax reforms are computed on the base of the 1998 gross 
labour incomes; therefore they are not meant to predict employment effects of either reform.   
Given the changes in income tax added to the 1998 tax schedule till the 2002 Financial 
Law, more women would participate to the labour market, i.e. 34.65% women in 2002 against 
47.58% in 1998 prefer not to work. But they would also prefer part-time to full-time jobs, as the 
mode moves from 40 to 20 weekly hours (see Table 34). Men are less reactive to the 2002  tax 
reform compared to women, as the most relevant change is an increase of  10 weekly hours 
(from 40 to 50) that affects 26.44% of men (see Table 36).  
Under linear taxation, instead, both men and women prefer extreme values of labour 
supply, due to the introduction of  the minimum guaranteed income (that produces an effect 
similar to the poverty trap) and of the unique and high tax rate. Specifically, more women 
would choose not to participate (56.44% against the starting percentage of 47.58), whereas a 
relevant percentage of men would either reduce or raise of 10 hours their weekly full time 
labour supply, so that only 39.31% against the initial value of 72.68% of men would work at 40 
hours (see Table 37). 
Tables 38 and 39 report the joint variation in labour supply of the woman and the man 
within a household due to either reform. In both cases nearly a third of the sample has no 
variation. The 2002 tax changes encourage a tiny increase in labour supply of both partners, 
whereas linear taxation encourages substitutability in the use of time of the couple. 
Table 40 depicts the average value for individual consumption and labour supply obtained 
after the two reforms. The reduction in couples’ tax liabilities produced by both tax reforms 
benefits, at least at the mean, the woman, as her individual consumption level increases even 
more than proportionally.  
Tables 41 and 42 show that single men and single women are less reactive compared to 
individuals in couple to either tax reform. The 96% of single men prefer to have the same labour 
supply chosen in 1998 also after each tax  reform. Single women are more reactive than single 
men and in both cases about 40% would reduce of 10 or 20 hours their supplies.  
Tables 43 to 46 compare predictions in labour supply changes induced by each tax 
reform, for men and women in couples and predicted by the two theoretical model here 
analysed. In both reforms the largest discrepancies between the collective and the unitary model 
are found in the male labour supply, as only 35% (31%) of the cases are on the diagonal when 
the 2002 reform (the linear income tax) is introduced in the simulation exercise. Moreover, 
husbands are expected to react much more to the first reform according to the unitary model 
than what predicted by the collective framework.  The unitary model also predict a higher drop 
in women’s participation, as 2.45% with the first reform  and 8.91%  with the second are 
women that prefer not to participate, even though in 1998 were observed working full-time. 
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Table 34: Wives’ labour supply pre-reform vs. 2002 reform – collective model  
     2002 Reform        
1998  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  32.67   14.27  0.64        47.58 
20  1.63  8.79  2.15   0.23    12.81 
30  0.17 2.97 3.32   0.82 0.12  7.40 
40  0.17   3.03   9.32   14.97  2.56 30.05 
50   0.06 0.29 0.47    1.34  2.15 
Total  34.65 29.12 15.73    16.48  4.02  1717 
 
 
Table 35: Wives’ labour supply pre-reform vs. linear tax reform – collective model 
    Linear Tax Reform        
1998 0  20  30  40  50  Total 
0  46.65    0.82   0.12       47.58 
20  6.52   5.13   1.11   0.06     12.81 
30  1.81   3.84   1.46   0.29     7.40 
40  1.46   7.69   12.17   7.11   1.63 30.05 
50    0.35   0.29   0.93   0.58  2.15 
Total  56.44   17.82   14.74   8.39   2.21  1717 
 
 
Table 36: Husbands labour supply pre-reform vs. 2002 reform– collective model 
     2002 Reform        
1998  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  0.23  0.17 0.06      0.47 
20    1.16  1.40 0.29 0.12  2.97 
30  0.06   0.41  2.10  2.04 0.35  4.95 
40  0.12   1.22  7.28  37.62  26.44 72.68 
50   0.06 0.06 2.97  15.84  18.93 
Total  0.41 3.03  10.89  42.92  42.75  1717 
 
 
Table 37: Husbands labour supply pre-reform vs. linear tax reform– collective model 
     Linear Tax  Reform        
1998  0 20 30 40 50  Total 
0  0.47       0.47   
20  0.76  0.76  1.05 0.41    2.97 
30  0.58 0.76 1.40  1.98 0.23  4.95 
40  1.98 3.84  11.47  33.31  22.07 72.68 
50  0.06   0.06 3.61  15.14  18.93 
Total  3.84 5.42  13.98  39.31  37.45  1717 
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Table 38: Variation in labour supply of couples with the 2002 reform: women vs. men– 
collective model 
    M e n          
Women  -40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  Total 
-40       0.06  0.12      0.17 
-30        0.17  0.06    0.23 
-20   0.06    0.23  3.03  1.57    4.95 
-10     0.17 1.28 6.06  4.95 0.23 0.06  12.75 
0  0.12 0.06 0.93 6.81  35.64  16.89 0.52 0.12  61.09 
10     0.06 0.87 3.15  1.46    5.53 
20     0.12 1.40 8.27  4.83     14.62 
30       0.52  0.12    0.64 
Total  0.12 0.12 1.28  10.66  56.96  29.88 0.82 0.17  1717 




Table 39: Variation in labour supply of couples with the linear income tax: women vs. 
men– collective model 
     M e n        
Women  -50 -40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  Total 
-40        1.22  0.23   1.46 
-30       0.06 0.23 1.05  0.76 0.06 2.39 
-20 0.06      0.23  1.75  7.86  4.54 0.06  15.26 
-10       0.12  1.51  9.32  5.71 0.23  16.37 
0  0.00  1.98  0.64  4.02 11.94 29.41 12.64  0.29 60.92 
10       0.17  0.35  1.81  0.70   3.15 
20        0.35  0.52    0.87 
30         0.06  0.06     0.12 
Total 0.06  1.98  0.64  4.66  15.84  50.03  25.10 0.64  1717 
Note: Each cell contains frequencies and empty cells are those with 0%. 
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Table 40: Average labour supply and consumption –couples– collective model  
  1998 system  2002 reform  Linear income tax 
f c   474.79 526.85  498.15 
f h   17.86 17.88  17.88 
m c   258.38 243.01  216.47 
m h   40.45 40.62  40.62 




Table 41: Variation in labour supply of single men: the 2002 
reform vs. the linear taxation– collective model 
  Linear income tax   
2002 Reform  0  10  Total 
-10 0.40    0.40 
0  96.00   96.00 
10 3.20  0.40  3.60 
Total 99.60  0.40  250 





Table 42: Variation in labour supply of single women: the 2002 
reform vs. the linear taxation– collective model 
      Linear  income  tax   
2002  Reform  -30 -20 -10  0  Total 
-30  0.43     0.43 
-20   9.01 0.43   9.44 
-10    1.72  26.61   28.33 
0     0.43  60.94  61.37 
10      0.43  0.43 
Total 0.43  10.73  27.470  61.37  233 
Note: Each cell contains frequencies and empty cells are those with 0%. 
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Table 43: Variation in men labour supply with the 2002 reform: collective vs. unitary  
      Unitary           
Collective  -50  -30  -20 -10  0 10 20 30 40 50  Total 
-40           0.12      0.12 
-30   0.00    0.06    0.06     0.12 
-20   0.12  0.06  0.12 0.58 0.99         1.28 
-10   0.06  0.64  4.78  2.62 4.89 0.29        10.66 
0 0.06  0.64  4.19  24.52  7.05  25.04 1.34 0.93 0.06 0.12  56.96 
10   0.17  0.87  3.79  1.98  22.60  1.75 0.70      29.88 
20     0.06       0.52 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.82 
30          0.06  0.12     0.17 
Total  0.06  0.99  5.82 33.26 12.23 53.64  4.02  1.86  0.12  0.17  1717 





Table 44: Variation in women labour supply with the 2002 reform: collective vs. unitary  
    U n i t a r y          
Collective  -40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  Total 
-40  0.12     0.06       0.17 
-30   0.17          0.23 
-20 0.52  0.06  2.56  0.23 0.82 0.58 0.12 0.06 4.95 
-10  0.99 0.76 3.20 3.15  1.63 2.62 0.41    12.75 
0  0.70 0.70 4.60 2.85  42.46  7.05 2.15 0.58  61.09 
10  0.12 0.06 0.76 0.64 1.34 1.98  0.47 0.23 5.53 
20   0.06   0.06 8.74   5.53   14.62 
30       0.47    0.00  0.64 
Total  2.45 1.81  11.12 7.05  55.45  12.23 8.85 1.05  1717 
Note: Each cell contains frequencies and empty cells are those with 0%. 
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Table 45: Variation in men labour supply with the linear tax reform: collective vs. unitary  
     U n i t a r y            
Collective  -50 -40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  40  50  Total 
-50  0.00       0.06       0.06 
-40   0.00     0.35  0.93  0.70      2.21 
-30     0.00     0.17 0.23 0.17       0.58 
-20      0.41  1.22 1.28 1.51 0.41       5.07 
-10  0.06 0.17 0.52 1.34 2.74  5.94 5.59 0.29 0.23      16.66 
0  0.29 0.58 0.93 4.66    9.96  18.40  13.74 0.52   0.06 0.12  50.03 
10   0.23   1.69 4.25 7.40   9.38  1.46 0.76      24.81 
20        0.12  0.17  0.29  0.41    0.58 
Total  0.35 0.99 1.46 8.33  18.52  34.30  31.33 3.15 1.40 0.06 0.12 1717 





Table 46: Variation in women labour supply with the linear tax reform: collective vs. unitary  
       Unitary         
Collective  -50 -40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  Total 
-40 0.00  0.99    0.12 0.12 0.17 0.06     1.46 
-30 0.17    1.69   0.17 0.23 0.12     2.39 
-20  0.12 3.61 0.58 7.05  0.99 2.15 0.87 0.29 0.17  15.26 
-10  0.06 2.85 0.17 2.33  3.55  3.79 1.69 0.41    16.37 
0 0.17  1.11    3.44  1.75  49.68  2.33 0.93 0.41  60.40 
10   0.35    0.99  0.12  0.76  0.35  0.17 0.23 3.15 
20         0.82    0.00   0.87 
30         0.12      0.00  0.12 
Total  0.52 8.91 4.14  13.98  6.70  57.72  5.42  1.81  0.82 1717 
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8.2 Normative aspects 
 
The empirical techniques used in this study allow us to analyse the individual welfare 
changes within a household, induced by a tax reform. Figures 13 to 20 reproduce the 
distribution of changes in individual utilities by deciles of the pre-reform distribution of 
household before tax disposable income. In this new framework the traditional impossibility of 
interpersonal welfare comparisons still stays, but, as the compositions of households by deciles 
remains unaffected by tax reforms, the graphs can provide a figure of the proportions of winners 
and losers, even within a households.  
In each figure a box plot is produced, for each reform and for the four types of individuals 
here examined (single men, single women, men and women in couples). Each box contains 
welfare changes included between the 25
th and the 75
th percentile, whereas the lines emerging 
from the box define the range between  () 25 75 75 5 . 1 Q Q Q − +  and  () 25 75 25 5 . 1 Q Q Q − − , where 
Q indicates each quartile of the distribution. All values out of this range are plotted individually. 
The line in each box identifies the mean value whereas the line crossing all income deciles 
distinguishes welfare gains from welfare losses.  
All types of households are expected to benefit in welfare terms from the 2002 tax 
changes since they allow higher net incomes. The two plots for singles confirm this expectation, 
as in both cases only positive values are plotted at all deciles (see Figures 13 and 15). 
Conversely, Figures 17 and 19 highlight that not necessarily both individuals in a couple benefit 
from the 2002 tax reform. The effect depicted in each graph indicates overall a welfare gain for 
women and a welfare loss for men, at least if we consider only values of the distribution 
included in each box. Only 10.60% of households have both partners winning from the reform, 
against 83.40% of women that are winning also at the expense of their husband and 5.71% of 
husbands that are the only one benefiting. Women gaining from the 2002 reforms are in all 
income deciles, whereas those few men that benefit are located from the 4
th deciles onwards. 
A different picture is drawn with the linear income tax. Because of the way linear income 
tax has been drawn both groups of singles are almost all welfare losers (see Figure 14 and 16). 
Only 19% of single women and 6.4% of single men are indifferent to the reform, all these cases 
are in the lowest income deciles. As far as couples are concerned, only the 2.68% are gaining 
from the introduction of a linear income tax and again a very high percentage of women (89%) 
are winning at the expenses of men. The similarity with respect to the 2002 reform might be due 
to the fact that the transfer to households of a minimum guaranteed income in the former, as 
well as the increase in child tax relieves in the latter have an analogue impact on the individual 
power index, benefiting particularly women. The very few cases where men only are gaining are 
mostly located at the highest and at the 4
th income deciles (see Figures 18 and 20).  44 
 






























































































































































































































































The aim of this study has been to highlight the distortions produced whenever tax reforms 
are evaluated on the base of  unitary household models, when instead collective models provide 
a description of within household decision making, closer to the observed behaviour. According 
to the unitary view, income is shared within a household depending on demographic factors, as 
they affect preferences. The collective framework instead emphasises the role also plaid by each 
spouse’ earnings in explaining the changes in their relative weight during the couple’s decision 
process.  
We addressed this issue by simulating the observed labour supplies of a sample of Italian 
households with a collective model and by estimating a unitary model on the simulated data. A 
comparison of the results produced with the two approaches pointed out that labour supplies are 
over-predicted for men and under-predicted for women with a unitary model. We found out also 
that only 34% of men working hours and 57% of women labour supplies were correctly 
predicted with a traditional model, much better results were previously obtained with the 
simulation of the collective model. 
In terms of policy evaluation the discrepancies produced by the two approaches are even 
greater. Considering the collective model as the base and examining two tax reforms (the 2002 
tax changes and a linear income tax), only a third of either women or men are well predicted by 
the unitary model. The same approach also recorded a much higher variation in male and female 
labour supply induced by each tax reform: in particular, we found a larger drop in female 
participation rate and a bigger increase in men working hours. 
Exploring the normative implications of the two tax reforms under the collective 
framework here developed, the analysis pointed out a number of diverging welfare effects 
predicted within the couple, due to tax changes. Such effects can only be disentangled under the 
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